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Insights | Punter Southall Analytics | Opt-Out Collective Actions: 10 Upsides and Downsides for 10 Years

Written by Punter Southall Analytics | 14 November 2025

In 2025, the UK marks a decade since the introduction of the opt-out collective actions regime under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 2015). This regime, deployed via the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), was designed to provide consumers and small businesses with a more effective route to redress in claims for widespread harms caused by anti-competitive behaviour. In August, the government issued a call for evidence to help them assess and review the regime’s operation and impact.[1]

As we reflect on the first ten years, here are ten upsides and downsides that capture how the regime has developed, the challenges it faces, and the opportunities ahead.

UPSIDES

1    A major legal innovation

The CRA 2015 introduced an opt-out collective action mechanism for UK competition law cases.[2] Prior to this, claims were mostly individual or opt-in. The opt-out model allows a class of claimants to be automatically included unless they choose to opt out. This shift was intended to make redress practical in situations where many consumers (or small businesses) suffer loss, but their losses individually are too small to justify independent litigation.

2    Certification process and representative role

A pivotal step in any collective action under this regime is the CAT’s certification of the class, and the appointment of a class representative.[3] The certification test was clarified by the landmark Merricks v Mastercard judgment in December 2020, in which the UK Supreme Court held that the threshold for certification is relatively low (emphasising that the representative need not define each class member’s loss or prove individual liability at the certification stage).[4] This clarity unlocked a second wave of filings as a clearer picture of the regime’s operational mechanics began to emerge. The most recent certification decision was handed down today (14th November) with the CAT confirming certification for four opt-out claims brought by Justin Gutmann against mobile operators.[5]

3    Growing caseload and scale

As parties developed greater visibility of the workings of opt-out collective actions, the regime saw a marked uptick in activity, peaking in 2023 when 17 opt-out claims were filed (see below). According to the recent government call for evidence, the regime’s caseload has “grown significantly … with tens of billions of pounds in damages claimed”.[6] While the early years were modest, later filing levels show increased confidence among claimants, funders and representative counsel. There has been some concern however that, as a result, the CAT will become swamped by excessive opt-out claims.

4    Balance between access and burden on businesses

A key original objective of the regime was to encourage redress while avoiding imposing undue burdens on business. The government’s call for evidence recognises this, stating that the regime must be “proportionate and focused on returns to consumers where they are due” while acknowledging “the potential burden on business that increased exposure to litigation can present”.[7] Ensuring that claimants can bring meritorious claims but that defendants are not exposed to speculative litigation remains a delicate balancing act, and one that all interested parties are keen to maintain with proper oversight from the CAT.

5    The next decade: potential for evolution

Now that the regime has entered its second decade, the launch of the government review signals that change may be on the horizon.[8] Topics in scope include whether the regime’s scope should be expanded (e.g. to non-competition claims), how funding should be regulated, how to improve efficiency, and how to ensure that redress genuinely reaches consumers.

 

DOWNSIDES

1    Scope remains limited to competition law

Although the regime is now well-established, its legal base remains narrowly confined: the opt-out collective action route is only available for losses resulting from breaches of competition law (under the Competition Act 1998 as amended by CRA 2015).[9] Claims relating purely to consumer protection, data privacy, environmental harms or other mass-harm scenarios cannot (yet) utilise the opt-out route unless they can be framed as competition law breaches. This limitation is frequently mentioned as a constraint on the regime’s potential.

2    Few judgments so far

Despite the increase in filings, the number of substantive trial judgments remains very limited. In fact, only two opt-out cases have reached judgment in the CAT so far: Le Patourel v BT and Kent v Apple. The lack of precedent (on issues such as damages quantification, funder return and distribution of unclaimed damages) means uncertainty remains for all stakeholders.

3    Shift from follow-on to stand-alone claims

When the regime was introduced, the expectation was that most collective actions would be follow-on (i.e. pursuing damages after a competition authority or regulator has found an infringement). However, the reality is different: roughly 90% of the filed collective actions have been stand-alone claims (where no prior regulatory finding exists).[10] Stand-alone claims are inherently more complex: the claimant must establish the breach, causation and loss, rather than relying on a prior finding. This shift has raised questions about complexity, costs and the suitability of some claims for the opt-out route.

4    Funding remains a critical issue

Bringing and managing collective actions of this nature is resource-intensive: expert economists, disclosure, legal teams, class-member communications and settlement / distribution logistics all add up. The regime relies heavily on third-party litigation funding. In July 2023, the UK Supreme Court ruled in PACCAR that litigation funding agreements which provide funder return based on the level of damages recovered are damages-based agreements, which cannot be used to fund opt-out collective actions. Responses to the government call for evidence have highlighted this as a key reason for the dip in filings over the past two years, and have urged the government to reverse the effect of the ruling.

5    Distribution of redress and member take-up

One of the aims of the regime was to ensure that redress reaches harmed individuals and businesses. Yet evidence suggests the actual take-up by class members can be low in some cases (for example Gutmann v SSWT), and unclaimed funds can represent a significant issue.[11] Moreover, how unclaimed funds are allocated (to charity, to funders, to costs) remains a live issue and may affect claimant incentives and fairness perceptions.

Looking back and looking ahead

Ten years on, the UK’s opt-out collective action regime has certainly made an impact: it introduced a mechanism to aggregate mass-small harms, triggered a surge of filings, and prompted new litigation strategies. Yet its real-world efficacy in delivering compensation to end consumers remains modest so far relative to early ambitions. The limited number of judgments, the dominance of standalone claims, the unresolved funding and distribution issues — these all point to a regime still evolving rather than one fully matured.

For claimants, funders and defendants alike, the next few years will be telling. Will the CAT see a meaningful increase in trials and binding decisions? Will the funding market adapt to ensure fair claimant returns and reduced cost burdens? Will the scope of the regime broaden, or will it focus on refining what already exists? And above all, will the promise of meaningful redress for large numbers of harmed consumers be realised?

As we celebrate the first decade, we should recognise both the progress achieved and the work ahead. The opt-out collective action regime offers a powerful tool—but its effectiveness will be judged not just by filings but by fair, efficient and accessible delivery of justice to the many whose losses might otherwise be too small to litigate.

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We hope you've found this article of interest.

If you'd like to discuss it, or any other matters where we may be able to assist you, please contact David Rankin on david.rankin@puntersouthallgroup.com.

 

[1] Opt-out collective actions regime review: call for evidence - GOV.UK

[2] Consumer Rights Act 2015 - Explanatory Notes

[3] Consumer Rights Act 2015 - Explanatory Notes

[4] Breaking New Ground: The Growth of UK Collective Actions | Advisories | Arnold & Porter

[5] Judgment (Certification and Limitation) | Competition Appeal Tribunal

[6] Opt-out collective actions regime review: call for evidence - GOV.UK

[7] Opt-out collective actions regime review: call for evidence - GOV.UK

[8] UK Government Reviews Opt-Out Collective Actions Regime

[9] The Substantive Scope of the UK Collective Action Regime |

[10] Opt-out collective actions regime review: call for evidence - GOV.UK

[11] 1304/7/7/19 Justin Gutmann v First MTR South Western Trains Limited and Another - Judgment (Stakeholder Entitlement) | 7 Nov 2025; UK competition law collective proceedings regime evolving a decade on